Apportionment methods round vote proportions to integer numbers of seats in parliament. Seat biases of an apportionment method are expected differences between the seats actually apportioned to the parties and their ideal fractional shares of seats. In this letter it is shown that, for many popular apportionment methods, asymptotic seat biases for an increasing number of seats in parliament do not depend on the distributional assumption for the vote counts.
Introduction
In proportional representation systems, electoral vote proportions have to be mapped to seat allocations, using apportionment methods. On the basis of early ideas of Pólya [1] [2] [3] [4] , seat biases induced by this adjustment process can be addressed by a geometric-combinatorial approach. In the following, the vector w = (w 1 , . . . , w ) t of vote proportions in favour of the competing parties is considered to be a random vector in the probability simplex S := {w ∈ [0, 1] : i=1 w i = 1}. Assuming that the parties are ordered according to their vote counts, the seat bias is defined as the conditional expectation of the difference between the numbers of seats actually allocated to the parties A(w) and their ideal shares of seats wM,
where M is the number of seats in parliament. Previous work has focused on uniformly distributed vote proportions [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] . For an alternative model see [11] . The vector m = (m 1 , . . . , m ) t of seat allocations, representing the number of seats assigned to each party, has integer non-negative components summing to M. A survey on apportionment methods is given in [12, 13] . In this letter the asymptotic behaviour of seat biases is analyzed for a growing number of seats in parliament under general assumptions for the distribution of the electoral vote proportions, which usually is not known in detail. 2. Results and discussion Theorem 1. Let the distribution of the vote proportions w have a Riemann integrable Lebesgue density f (w) on the probability simplex S . Then the asymptotic seat bias for a q-stationary divisor method is
If f (w) ∈ C 2 (S ) then the asymptotic seat bias for the method of Hamilton/Hare is
Proof. Eq. (2) is established in [14, Corollary 3.2], see also [15] . In order to prove Eq. (3), we expand
, for all x 0 ∈ S ≥ := {w ∈ S : w 1 ≥ . . . ≥ w }. Then we proceed analogously to the geometric-combinatorial approach in [7] . In particular, we apply the decomposition of S into rounding polytopes P(m) := cl{w ∈ S : A(w) = m}, where cl denotes set closure. Detailed knowledge about the vertices of these rounding polytopes entails [5] 
for all w ∈ P(m). By [6, Theorem 2], we therefore can write
with polynomials
not depending on the apportionment method used. Here K r (M), r ≤ , is the set of seat allocations with r nonvanishing components, and b r (m) denotes the number of permutations of these components leaving m invariant. Moreover, p(r ) is the distribution of the seat allocation vector A(w) in the case of a uniform distribution on S ≥ , which turns out to depend only on the number of parties actually obtaining at least one seat [6, Theorems 1 and 4] . Because the two leading order terms of p( ) and p( − 1) in an expansion in the house size M are identical for the stationary divisor method with standard rounding (q = 1/2) and the method of Hamilton/Hare [7, Proofs of Theorems 1 and 2] the proof is complete, and (3) results from (2) by setting q = 0.5.
Theorem 1 states that the apportionment methods of Webster/Sainte-Laguë (q = 1/2) and Hamilton/Hare are asymptotically unbiased for M → ∞ under very mild assumptions on the distribution of the vote proportions. For q-stationary divisor methods with parameter q = 0.5 finite seat biases arise, which, due to (5), are given by the barycenter of the weight function f (w) on S ≥ .
